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ABSTRACT
This essay explores the manner in which the political 
and intellectual origin of the speech and press provisions 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States can be explained by the political theory of James 
Madison.
The analysis begins with an examination of the 
constitutional theory of James Madison. In particular, 
various of Madison's conceptual devices, which he combined 
for the purpose of controlling the dangerous influence of 
factions in an extended republic, are explored.
The analysis continues with an examination of the 
partisan struggle surrounding the creation and ratification 
of the Constitution and how that struggle made the creation 
of the Bill of Rights a political necessity.
Finally, it is argued that Madison championed adoption 
of the First Amendment because it both satisfied his 
political interests and complimented his political theory. 
In addition, the author suggests that Madison's political 
theory provides the most meaningful context in which to 
understand the role of free speech and a free press in the 
American constitutional tradition.
JAMES MADISON AND THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
What the production of steel was to the industrial age, 
the management and dissemination of information is to our 
age. Indeed, the so-called post-industrial age in which we 
now live has so often been referred to as the information 
age that the term itself has become something of a cliche: 
it is familiar from overuse, yet suggests more than it 
explains. In any event, recognizing the importance of 
exchanging information and ideas is not something unique to 
the information age. Ever since the creation of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, preserving the 
expression of ideas has come to occupy an exalted place in 
the American political paradigm. In particular, by 
characterizing speech and press as guaranteed freedoms, the 
First Amendment suggests that the founding fathers 
recognized the importance of information exchange as a 
necessary component of constitutional government. 
Ascertaining exactly how important or how necessary a 
component the founders considered these freedoms to be, 
however, is a difficult proposition. Unfortunately, in many 
respects the speech and press provisions of the First 
Amendment are like the term "information age:” they suggest 
more than they explain.
2
3Attempting to understand the significance of speech and 
press freedoms in our system of government, therefore, is 
more difficult than at first supposed. While some might 
think these freedoms are so central to our nation's 
political values that to ask the question at all is 
ridiculous,1 if they are in fact so centrally important, 
then their meaning should be readily discoverable by 
analysis and thoughtful inquiry. Though the rhetorical 
explanation emerges almost reflexively, explaining that a 
free press and free speech are fundamental pre-requisites of 
a free society, it is interesting to note that such a self- 
evident truth is not borne out by examining the intentions 
and political theory of the founders. Indeed, the 
historical record suggests that the First Federal Congress 
crafted the First Amendment in 1789 for the express purpose
1 Thomas Kuhn writes that 11 [s]cientists [and by 
inference social scientists] work from models acquired 
through education and through subsequent exposure to the 
literature often without quite knowing or needing to know 
what characteristics have given these models the status of 
community paradigms. And because they do so, they need no 
full set of rules. The coherence displayed by the research 
tradition in which they participate may not imply even the 
existence of an underlying body of rules and assumptions 
that additional historical or philosophical investigation 
might uncover. That scientists do not usually ask or debate 
what makes a particular problem or solution legitimate 
tempts us to suppose that, at least intuitively, they know 
the answer. But it may only indicate that neither the 
question nor the answer is felt to be relevant to their 
research. Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more 
complete than any set of rules for research that could be 
unequivocally abstracted from them.” Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970), 46.
4of silencing Antifederalist critics who still desired, some 
two years after the Constitutional Convention, to scuttle 
the new national government. Moreover, the historical 
record suggests that the First Amendment was crafted in such 
a way as to essentially leave in place, unaltered, the 
political framework of the 1787 constitution.
Nonetheless, the historical record does support the 
notion that speech and press freedom do have a role to play 
in the constitutional model of republican government 
envisioned by the founders. And to the extent that this 
original conception continues to infuse the contemporary 
constitutional order with meaning, speech and press freedom 
continue to play an instrumental role. To fully understand 
what this role is, however, requires that we use the 
historical record in general, and the writings of James 
Madison in particular, to deconstruct, and thereby 
transcend, the rhetorical record in order to create a 
satisfactory model explaining the enduring significance of 
speech and press freedom. By doing so, not only is the 
First Amendment infused with more particularized historical 
meaning but its role in the political order, both past and 
present, will emerge more meaningfully as well.
CHAPTER I
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGIN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States occupies a singularly important, if not sacred, 
position in the American political tradition. The ability 
to speak one's mind, publish one's sentiments, criticize 
government, and advocate or agitate for political change 
generally free from official restraint are the hallmarks of 
American-style democracy. Nonetheless, the First Amendment, 
and all that it has come to represent in our contemporary 
political order, did not emerge effortlessly from the 
founding era. On the contrary, the origin of the First 
Amendment, speech and press freedom in particular, is best 
understood as a product of the various intellectual, 
political and cultural forces that shaped the nature and the 
substance of the political debate in the United States 
during the last decades of the eighteenth century. To come 
to terms with origin of the First Amendment, we must address 
each of these forces individually. We begin with the 
intellectual.
5
6A. The Documentary Record of the Founding Fathers
Though the historical record explaining the origin and 
original purpose of the First Amendment spans the entire 
founding era, of particular significance is the period from 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 through the First 
Federal Congress in 1789. Unfortunately, examining even 
this limited period presents significant difficulties. 
Foremost among these is undoubtedly the quality and 
credibility of the primary sources themselves. For example, 
historian James H. Hutson documents how the notes of Robert 
Yates, published in 1821 as the Secret Proceedings and 
Debates of the Convention Assembled at Philadelphia in the 
Year 1787. were so significantly altered under the partisan 
editorship of Edmond C. "Citizen" Genet that they "cannot be 
considered a reliable record of what occurred at the 
Philadelphia Convention and cannot be consulted as a source 
of the intentions of the framers."2 Even the Notes of James 
Madison, considered by many to be the most reliable record 
of the Constitutional Convention, are frequently criticized. 
For example, Madison seems to have recorded his own comments 
with a degree of thoroughness, arguably bordering on 
embellishment, curiously lacking in the comments attributed 
to other delegates.3 Unfortunately, the official record of
2 James H. Hutson, "The Creation of the Constitution:y 
The Integrity of the Documentary Record," Texas Law Review 
65 (November 1986): 9-12.
3 Ibid. 31-33.
7the Constitutional Convention is just as questionable. For 
example, Max Farrand, editor of the first standard 
compilation of the official record of the Constitutional 
Convention, warns readers that the Journal of the Convention 
was so carelessly kept that it cannot be relied upon 
absolutely. In particular, on the matter of debates and 
votes, Farrand suggests that the Journal "should be accepted 
somewhat tentatively."4
The shortcomings of the historical record are at least 
partially explained by the fact that the delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention met in secrecy and had every 
reason for wanting to keep their deliberations strictly 
confidential. After all, delegates to the convention had 
gathered for the politically charged purpose of amending and 
perhaps replacing the existing federal government. Toward 
this end, the Convention was closed to non-delegates, the 
press was barred from attending, and rules of procedure 
adopted at the start of the Convention prohibited members 
from discussing convention business outside the meeting 
hall.5 Even the various letters from convention delegates 
to friends and colleagues are questionable in that they 
represent the selective dissemination of privileged
4 Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787. rev. ed. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1937) 1: xiii-xiv.
5 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal 
Convention of 1787, bicentennial edition (New York: Norton, 
1987), 27-28.
8information.
Serious questions exist about the provenance of the 
documentary records of the state ratifying conventions as 
well. For example, Hutson describes Jonathan Elliot's 
Debates, the standard documentary collection of the 
deliberations of the state ratifying conventions, as a 
"bibliographical brainteaser, for it was republished in at 
least seven ... editions [following the original 1827-1830 
edition], in differing numbers of volumes, with the contents 
of individual volumes differing in many cases from edition 
to edition."6 Additionally, Hutson argues that Elliot 
appears to have let contemporary political concerns, such as 
nullification, shade his presentation of the record. 
Moreover, the primary records themselves appear to reflect 
the selective, partisan sympathies of the various 
individuals who originally recorded the debates.
The documentary record of the First Amendment is 
similarly incomplete. As Hutson observes, only half of the 
debate in the First Congress over the Bill of Rights 
survives in that the Senate prohibited its proceedings from 
being recorded. As for the proceedings in the House, Hutson 
notes that the official record, as reported by Thomas Lloyd, 
most clearly evidences not the proceedings, but Lloyd's 
wandering mind in that his notes are "periodically 
interrupted by doodling, sketches of members, horses and
6 Hutson, 13.
9landscapes, and by poetry.”7
With such limitations in the documentary record, it is 
appropriate to ask if it is at all possible to ascertain 
what the founders intended. More importantly still, the 
question arises that given what we know about the divisive 
and often secretive nature of American politics in our own 
age, what is the likelihood that the body of law created by 
the founders is attributable to a readily ascertainable 
intent? If little or none, it becomes doubly unlikely that 
we can speak of the founders' intentions in anything more 
than a vaguely generalized fashion. Even on issues where 
the founders compromised or appeared to agree with one 
another, it is possible, indeed likely, that their 
intentions for doing so varied. Consequently, one might 
reasonably argue that the founders' collective intent, if it 
existed at all, is unknowable, just as it was probably 
unknown to them.
While we may never know what constitutes the original 
intent of the founding fathers, we can discern the general 
political theory which animated their vision of republican 
government. More specifically, primary sources provide us 
with a fairly comprehensive view of James Madison's 
constitutional philosophy. As previously mentioned, his 
Notes are generally considered the most reliable account of 
the Constitutional Convention. Following that, according to
7 Ibid., 36.
10
Farrand and others, the Federalist Papers (a series of 
anonymous essays defending and the Constitution in the weeks 
preceding the New York ratifying convention), of which 
Madison was one of the principal authors, are the second 
most reliable source of original intent. In regard to the 
Bill of Rights, the documentary record of the First Federal 
Congress, though questionable as noted above, reveals 
Madison to be the driving force behind its inception. 
Furthermore, a wealth of supporting essays, articles and 
letters give us unparalleled additional insight into the 
political theory of Madison. Essentially, the historical 
record lends itself most readily to a determination of what 
Madison perceived to be the intent of the Constitution. 
Whether this perception was solely his own or reflected the 
views of his peers as well is difficult to determine. 
Nonetheless, as Hutson observes, the shortcomings of 
Madison's Notes are the yardstick (as I would argue all of 
his work can be characterized) by which we can measure the 
difficulty in determining the delegates' intentions.8
B. The Founder's Original Intent 
What Madison's Notes unquestionably reveal is that the 
Constitutional Convention did not agonize over, or even 
seriously consider, affording special protection to the
8 Ibid.. 35.
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freedoms of speech and press. Indeed, aside from a proposal 
for a bill of rights (including a speech and press 
provision) by South Carolina delegate Charles Pinckney 
(which later died in committee), and a disingenuous eleventh 
hour effort to scuttle the Constitution by delegates who 
held ulterior motives, the Notes indicate that speech and 
press freedom were not a serious concern of the Convention. 
In fact, it was not until political pressure arising from 
the ratification struggle forced the issue two years later 
that the First Congress undertook the effort to amend the 
Constitution with a bill of rights, including a free speech 
and press guarantee. Even then, the documentary records of 
the First Federal Congress indicate that the only prolonged 
debate over protecting speech and press centered not on 
whether these two were essential to the new framework of 
government, but whether members of Congress should be 
obligated to vote in the manner which popular opinion 
dictated. In response, Madison unequivocally assured his 
fellow legislators that they were not required to vote in 
Congress per the instructions of their constituents.9
While Madison's response may strike modern readers as 
surprisingly undemocratic, it is not at variance with 
Madison's constitutional theory. Indeed, nothing in any of
9 Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs 
Bickford, eds., Creating the Bill of Rights; the Documentary 
Record from the First Federal Congress (Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 153-156.
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Madison's writings from the founding era supports the notion 
that he viewed protecting press and speech freedom as 
essential to the creation, execution or adjudication of laws 
—  which, by any reasonable definition, is the basic purpose 
of government. Even when the freedoms of speech and press 
were elevated to the status of constitutionally protected 
rights, nothing in the documentary record suggests that the 
founders held a well articulated idea that what they were 
protecting was somehow fundamentally significant to the 
administration of government.10 On the contrary, in a 
letter to Richard Peters dated August 18, 1789, Madison 
described the creation of the Bill of Rights not as 
essential, but as a "nauseous project," one which he 
undertook for the expressly political purpose of silencing 
opponents to the Constitution and to honor campaign 
promises.11
Whether we interpret "nauseous project" as referring to 
the arduous political struggle that amending the 
Constitution would require, or more fundamentally as 
Madison's reluctance to adulterate the unamended 
Constitution with needless provisions, we will see it is 
clear that Madison was less than convinced that amendments 
were necessary. Nonetheless, Madison's eventual support and
10 Leonard Levy, The Emergence of a Free Press (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 267.
11 Veit, et al., Creating the Bill of Rights. 281-282.
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championing of the amendment cause is directly attributable 
to his political and intellectual commitment to the new 
federal Constitution: without amendments, the Constitution
would remain politically vulnerable and the intellectual 
justification on which it rested would remain in perpetual 
jeopardy. In sum, it was not until Madison became assured 
that the Constitution could be amended in a manner which 
would preserve its structural integrity, while at the same 
time defeating Antifederalist rhetoric, that he became 
convinced that amendments were appropriate even if 
unnecessary.
C. The Political Theory of James Madison
1. intellectual and historical antecedents 
James Madison's political theory was undoubtedly 
influenced by both the intellectual and political climate of 
his time. In 1769, at the age of eighteen, Madison entered 
the College of New Jersey at Princeton. Over the course of 
the next three years, Madison was exposed to the writings of 
most of the political philosophers who dominated 
intellectual life in the eighteenth century. In particular, 
as Ralph Ketcham describes, Madison was especially enamored 
by the writings of John Locke, accepting the notion that the 
human "mind is blank at birth [receives] all its furnishings 
through the senses ... and [can] hold an infinite variety of
14
insights and opinions.12 As a matter of cosmology,
Madison took the Newton-Locke world view at face value: 
the universe was marvelously harmonious; the discovery 
of facts about man and society would lead to progress 
and enlightenment; empiricism and dependence on laws 
of cause and effect were not incompatabile; and moral 
and social, as well as physical, understandings would 
benefit from the application of human study and 
reason.13
Madison also came of age in colonial America at a time 
when society at large placed a high value on open discourse 
concerning political matters. For example, the writings of 
“Cato" (the pen name of influential English journalists John 
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon), which advocated that truth 
should be a defense in prosecutions for seditious libel (a 
criminal cause of action punishing defamatory criticism of 
public officials), had been very popular in colonial America 
since the 1720's.14 In fact, as David Rabbin argues, the 
popularity of Cato's Letters, and the report of the Peter 
Zenger trial, were not only widely quoted and reported, but 
they virtually "eliminated prosecutions for seditious libel 
in the colonies.1,15 Nonetheless, as Leonard Levy observes, 
as of 1776, "[n]o state [had] abolished or altered the
12 Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography 
(Charlottesville': University of Virginia Press, 1990) , 51.
13 Ibid. , 50.
14 David M. Rabban, "Historical Perspectives on the Free
Press: [Book] Review Essay: The Ahistorical Historian: 
Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American 
History." 37 Stanford Law Review 795, 806 (1985).
15 Ibid.
15
common law of criminal defamation in general or seditious 
libel in particular, and no state court [had] ruled that the 
free press clause of its state constitution rendered void 
the prosecution of a libel.*'16 In sum, though a system of 
prior restraints on the press, such as the English press 
licensing system of the seventeenth century, did not exist 
in eighteenth-century America, criminal remedies for 
seditious libels, as articulated by English jurist Sir 
William Blackstone, remained theoretically possible.17
2. need for a new national government
When Madison and his peers gathered in Philadelphia in 
1787, resolving the seeming contradiction between speech and 
press freedom and the English common law was not of prime 
importance. Rather, delegates to the Convention gathered 
out of a common sense of urgency that a new, energetic 
national government was needed to better administer the 
affairs of their young nation. Such an undertaking, as 
Madison described, is "essential to that security against 
external and internal danger, and to that prompt and 
salutary execution of the laws, which enter into the very 
definition of good Government."18
16 Levy, 267.
17 Ibid. . 12.
18 Jacob E. Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 37," The 
Federalist (Middletown, Connecticut:y Wesleyan University 
Press, 1961), 233.
16
Of the external dangers facing the United States in 
1787 which warranted the creation of an energetic national 
government, British, Spanish and French land claims on the 
periphery of the new nation, as well as matters of 
interstate and international trade, were undoubtedly the 
most troubling. At a bare minimum, a strengthened national 
government of the kind eventually proposed would be better 
able, both in terms of financing and organization, to raise 
and support an army capable of defending the fledgling 
nation's borders.19 Such a government would also have 
enhanced authority both in its dealings with foreign 
governments, as well as in its role of settling disputes 
among the individual states.20 In addition, some have 
argued that the principal motivation behind creating an 
energetic national government was to simultaneously create 
and nurture an energetic national economy.21
3. internal dangers to self-government 
The bulk of Madison's constitutional philosophy, 
however, is concerned not with external threats, but with 
the internal dangers faced by government. As a political 
philosopher and veteran legislator, Madison knew full well
19 See generally, Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 3.”
20 See generally, Cooke, ed., “Federalist No. 8."
21 See generally, H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond. 336 U.S.
525 (1949).
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that the chief and most insidious obstacle to good 
government is human nature itself. Specifically, Madison's 
constitutional philosophy emerges from a psychology of human 
nature which understands that people are motivated largely 
by selfish concerns and passions.22 In Federalist No. 10, 
for example, Madison observes that:
[a]s long as the reason of man continues fallible, 
and he is at liberty to exercise it, different 
opinions will be formed. As long as the 
connection subsists between his reason and his 
self-love, his opinion and his passions will have 
a reciprocal influence on each other; and the 
former will be objects to which the latter will 
attach themselves.23
In other words, since human reasoning is imperfect,
individuals will form a variety of differing and imperfect
opinions. These opinions, in turn, will be self-serving, to
the extent that man's reasoning is tied to his self-love,
and will attach themselves to man's irrational faculties —
his passions.
While Madison was certainly not the first to identify 
self-interest as an underlying motive in human nature, his 
observation is unique in that it stresses this interest as 
the primary motivation in human nature. As David Epstein 
argues in The Political Theory of the Federalist:
[b]oth the economic view of self-interest which 
has come to be associated with liberalism, and the
22 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the 
Federalist (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984)
6 .
23 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10,” 58.
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political hopes for self-abnegation which were 
once associated with republicanism, obstruct an 
appreciation of this important aspect of man's 
nature, which is neither economic nor altruistic 
but is selfish and political. Human selfishness 
takes the form not only of self-indulgence and 
exertion in the pursuit of self-indulgence, but 
also of self-assertion. For this reason politics 
cannot be fully understood as either simply an 
arena for the practice of virtue or simply a realm 
for the competition or aggregation of interests.24
This realization that human behavior is best understood
as the result of selfish desires, including a desire for
self-assertion, is especially troubling for governments in
which citizens are allowed a participatory role in the
political process.
4. the problem of factions 
Madison, after systematically reviewing both modern and 
ancient forms of popular government, concluded that 
republics have a tendency to perish because individuals not 
only hold selfish desires unique to themselves but unite 
together in factions with others holding similar 
interests.25 Madison defined factions to mean any "number 
of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of 
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or the permanent and aggregate interests of
24 Epstein, 6.
25 See generally, Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10."
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the community.”26 Controlling the effects of faction was
for Madison both the chief justification for and chief
obstacle to popular governments.27
Based on the lessons of history, Madison concluded
that: "there ... are two methods of removing the causes of
faction: the one by destroying the liberty which is
essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every
citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same
interests.”28 Madison rejected the first remedy as worse
than the disease of faction and characterized the second as
wholly impractical in that the fallibility of human
reasoning gives rise to different opinions.29 The problem
of control is further exacerbated by the fact that human
beings will form into factions for any number of
inexplicable reasons. As Madison argued:
[a] zeal for different opinions concerning 
religion, concerning Government and many other 
points, as well of speculation as of practice; an 
attachment to different leaders ambitiously 
contending for pre-eminence and power; or to 
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have 
been interesting to the human passions, have in 
turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them 
with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more 
disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to 
co-operate for their common good. So strong is 
this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual 
animosities, that where no substantial occasion
26 Ibid. . 57.
27 Ibid.. 56.
28 Ibid. . 58.
29 Ibid.
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presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful 
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their 
unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent 
conflicts.30
Again, the problem is not that humans form different
opinions and hold different interests but that they attach
these to their passions and thereafter seek to assert their
ideas and themselves on others in a manner which is
detrimental to the common good. In that capacity, moreover,
humans possess unequal abilities to assert themselves. In
the absence of laws, for example, the physically strong are
better able to assert themselves over the weak. Even with
laws created by a popular government, those who are able to
better persuade their fellow citizens to adopt a particular
course of action or policy are likely to wield
disproportionate political power. Similarly, these and
other inequities in the talents and abilities of individuals
will likely result in a further, inequitable distribution of
power. As Madison observed:
[t]he diversity in the faculties of men from which 
the rights of property originate, is not less an 
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.
The protection of these faculties is the first 
object of Government. From the protection of 
different and unequal faculties of acquiring 
property, the possession of different degrees and 
kinds of property immediately results: and from
the influence of these on the sentiments and views 
of the respective proprietors, ensues a division 
of the society into different interests and 
parties.31
30 Ibid. . 58-59.
31 Ibid.
21
In other words, not only does the disparity in human 
reasoning give rise to different opinions, but it results in 
an unequal accumulation of power and property as well, 
causing yet further divisions and grounds for faction.
Most importantly, however, rather than controlling 
these different faculties in order to stem the tide of 
faction, Madison argues that it is the first object of 
government to protect them. In this respect, Madison 
appears to offer a contradictory observation by suggesting 
that government is required to protect something which 
causes faction, which in turn is the destroyer of 
government. In this regard, Madison concludes that ”[t]he 
inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of 
faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be 
sought in the means of controlling its effects."32
5. the extended republic:
controlling the effects of faction
(
The means that Madison proposed for relieving the
causes of faction are perhaps the most original and
ingenious contribution of the entire constitutional era.
Contemporary theorists, such as Montesquieu, argued that due
to the problem of factions, republican forms of government
are only practical in small countries comprised of a
32 Ibid. . 60.
citizenry with rather homogenous concerns and interests.33 
Madison, however, appears to have built his theory on the 
converse observation by David Hume that republicanism is 
best suited to large countries with a multiplicity of 
interests.34 Rather than relying on the similarity of 
interests found in small nations, Madison argued that the 
secret to controlling factions lay in expanding the republic 
into a so-called "extended republic" in order to ensure the 
richest possible diversity of interests. Madison observed 
that by doing so, the likelihood that one faction could gain 
enough power to oppress the interests of others was greatly 
diminished. In an extended republic, Madison argued, 
factions would simply counter-balance one another, and their 
ill effects would essentially cancel each other out. 
Moreover, a representative legislature confronted with the 
plurality of interests in an extended republic would be 
better able to resist the demands of special interests, 
rising above the popular fray and discerning the best course 
of action for the common good.
33 Montesquieu, De L'Esprit des Lois, book 8, chapter 16 
(p. 362) in Epstein, p. 92.
34 David Hume, "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," Essays: 
Moral. Political and Literary, ed. by Eugene F. Miller, rev. 
ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 512-529.
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6. natural aristocracy and the filtration of talent 
Though these observations may sound elitist, Madison 
and his peers had precisely this view of the role of 
government. Madison argued in Federalist No. 10 that the 
principal advantage of an extended republican government is 
that public views may be refined and enlarged "by passing 
them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose 
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, 
and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least 
likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations."35 Moreover, Madison argued that in an 
extended republic, electors "will be more likely to centre 
on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most 
diffusive and established characters.1,36 In other words, 
just as the extended republic enables the counter-checking 
of factious interests, elections in the extended republic 
will eliminate the most factious candidates and select only 
those with the proper character to discern the public good. 
Edmund Burke, an English contemporary of Madison's, in a 
November 3, 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol, observed 
that:
Parliament [and I take him to mean all 
representative legislatures] is not a congress of 
ambassadors from different and hostile interests, 
which interests each may maintain, as an agent and 
advocate, against other agents and advocates; but
35 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 10," 62.
36 Ibid. . 63.
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Parliament is a deliberative assembly of one 
nation, with one interest, that of the whole; 
where not local purposes, not local prejudices, 
ought to guide, but the general good, resulting 
from the general reason of the whole.37
Echoing this observation, Madison noted that:
[a] good government implies two things; first, 
fidelity to the object of government, which is the 
happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of 
the means by which that object can best be 
attained. Some governments are deficient in both 
these qualities: most governments are deficient
in the first. I scruple not to assert that in the 
American governments, too little attention has 
been paid to the last. The federal constitution 
avoids this error; and what merits particular 
notice, it provides for the last in a mode which 
increases the security for the first.38
Significantly, neither Madison's nor Burke's
observation places any emphasis on the capacity of the
governed to capably secure their own happiness, effectively
discrediting the notion that unrefined public opinion should
guide policy making. Rather, they argue that government
alone is capable of transcending such mundane concerns as
local prejudices to secure the people's happiness. In order
for government to honor this objective and to be considered
good by his definition, Madison maintains that it must
possess a knowledge about what constitutes the people's
happiness, and skilled enough in the mechanics of governing
to bring it about. Most importantly though, as indicated
37 Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., The 
Founders Constitution: Maior Themes (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), 392.
38 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 62,” 415.
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above, Madison believed that the strength of the system of 
government devised by the Constitution lay in its ability to 
effectively channel the knowledge and skills of those who 
govern in a way that best serves the happiness of the 
governed.
7. the assumption of virtue (public spiritedness)
Madison's political theory, though principally
concerned with human selfishness and self-assertion,
simultaneously appreciates, as a necessity, that the people
endorse the legitimacy of the system. For Madison, the
chief expression of the people's endorsement undoubtedly
occurs when the people, acting in the capacity of voters,
select men of the best character to hold public office.
Nonetheless, the extended republic yields an even more
fundamental expression of commitment. As Madison observed:
[jjustice is the end of government. It is the end of 
civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be 
pursued, until it be obtained, or until liberty is lost 
in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which 
the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the 
weaker, anarchy may truly be said to reign, as in the 
state of nature where the weaker is not secured against 
the violence of the stronger: And as in the latter
state [nature] even the stronger individuals are 
prompted by the uncertainty of their condition, to 
submit to a government which may protect the weak as 
well as themselves: So in the former state
[government], will the more powerful factions or 
parties be gradually induced by a like motive, to wish 
for a government which will protect all parties, the 
weaker as well as the more powerful.39
39 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 52," 352.
In other words, on some level, Madison's political theory
assumes that on balance, the people, despite their factious
proclivities, recognize the importance of protecting the
rights of both political majorities and minorities;
accordingly, the people expect their elected officials to
recognize this importance as well. As Gordon S. Wood
observes, so long as elected officials observe republican
principles, "the people [can] relax their jealousy and
suspicion and become open and trustful."40 Whether we call
it a commitment to justice, civic virtue, or "public
spiritedness," without this commitment, the founders
believed that no system of barriers (constitution, bill of
rights, separation of powers, federalism, etc.) could by
itself achieve good government.41 When asked what would
prevent Congress from passing laws to favor itself and a
select class of citizens at the expense of the People,
Madison answered:
the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and 
constitutional laws, and above all the vigilant and 
manly spirit which actuates the people of America —  a 
spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is 
nourished by it.42
Nonetheless, while such a commitment may foster the 
creation of popular government, Madison still recognized 
that imperfect human reasoning renders such spirit
40 Ibid. , 109.
41 Ibid.
42 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 57," 387.
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insufficient to maintain good government. Quite simply, as
Madison noted:
[i]f men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to 
be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
the government to controul itself. A dependence 
on the people is no doubt the primary controul on 
the government; but experience has taught mankind 
the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
By external controls, Madison is unquestionably
referring to the capacity of the extended republic to ensure
that "[a]mbition ... be made to counteract ambition.”44
8. structural safeguards: 
constitutional apportionment of power
Internal controls, on the other hand, deal more 
specifically and technically with the structural design of 
government itself so that such counteraction may be 
maintained. On the simplest level, Madison argued that the 
Constitution observes "the political maxim, that the 
legislative, executive and judiciary departments ought to be 
separate and distinct.1,45 In fact, Madison argued that 
”[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and 
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, 
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
43 Ibid.
44 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 51," 349.
45 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 47," 324.
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justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”46 On 
this level, therefore, the Constitution delegates separate 
spheres of authority to the three branches of government 
primarily as a means of diffusing political power. As a 
further control on the accumulation of political power in 
any one branch,' each branch is given a limited authority to 
check the abuses of the others (i.e., the presidential right 
of veto over legislation, the congressional right to 
override presidential vetoes, the advise and consent powers 
of the U.S. Senate over presidential appointments and 
treaties, etc.).
While these fundamental checks and balances in the 
federal government are familiar themes, perhaps less 
familiar is the fact that Madison viewed federalism as a 
fundamental check as well. Since the Constitution of the 
United States proposed a national government of limited 
powers only, the presumption was that the bulk of political 
power would continue to be exercised by the states.47 The 
extent to which this was a concession to the political 
reality of the day will be discussed shortly. What is 
important to emphasize here is that Madison's constitutional 
vision was driven by an understanding of human psychology 
which recognized that popular government, for the sake of 
civil society, is not only necessary but likely to perish.
46 Cooke, ed., “Federalist No. 47," 324.
47 See generally, Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 14."
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Federalism, the various checks and balances of the national 
government, virtue in the people and office-holders, as well 
as the general tendency of the extended republic to 
neutralize the power of factions, were the principal means 
Madison embraced as the manner to make popular government 
not only enduring but good.
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL ORIGIN OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The political theory of James Madison, as described in 
Chapter One, provides the intellectual context in which the 
origin of the First Amendment is most meaningfully 
understood. Apart from its intellectual pedigree, however, 
the origin of the First Amendment cannot be fully understood 
without considering the political struggle from which it 
emerged. It is often forgotten, for example, that the First 
Amendment was precisely that —  an amendment to the 
fundamental framework of government crafted at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787. Indeed, it is important 
to note that the Philadelphia Convention adjourned in the 
fall of 1787, having carefully designed the framework for a 
new national government, without ever seriously considering 
whether speech and press freedom should play any role 
whatsoever in the new government. The circumstances under 
which the Constitution was amended with the Bill of Rights 
are explained as much, if not more, by the political forces 
at work in America during the period 1787-1791 than by the 
intellectual concerns embodied in the political theory of 
the extended republic. It is precisely these forces to
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which our attention must now turn.
A. The Constitutional Convention
At the adjournment of the Constitutional Convention on 
Monday, September 17, 1787, delegate Benjamin Franklin 
remarked that he doubted "whether any other Convention we 
can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution.1,1 
And despite many minor reservations, including some held by 
Madison, all of the delegates to the Convention, except 
three, essentially agreed with Franklin and signed the 
Constitution sending it off to the states for ratification.
The three delegates who refused to sign did so for 
reasons that were later to play themselves out in the 
struggle for ratification eventually culminating in the Bill 
of Rights. One of them, Virginia delegate George Mason, 
publicly stated three weeks after the convention adjourned 
that he opposed the Constitution because, among other 
things, it contained "no declaration of rights ..."2 As 
the principle author of Virginia's 1776 Declaration of 
Rights, Mason's objection might seem completely reasonable 
until we consider that he waited until five days before the 
Convention adjourned to suggest that a bill of rights be
1 Madison, Notes, 653.
2 Cecelia M. Kenyon, The Anti-Federalists (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1985), 192.
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included in the Constitution.3 Even more interesting is 
the fact nearly a week before calling for a bill of rights, 
he had already announced that he would "sooner chop off his 
right hand than put it to the Constitution..." Mason 
reasoned that certain points [unrelated to a declaration of 
rights] remained to be settled, and "[s]hould these points 
be improperly settled [in the remaining two weeks of 
deliberation], his wish would then be to bring the whole 
subject before another general Convention."4 Edmund 
Randolph, another member of the Virginia delegation to the 
Convention who ultimately refused to sign the Constitution, 
concurred in Mason's objection arguing that "the State 
[ratifying] Conventions should be at liberty to propose 
amendments to be submitted to another General Convention 
which may reject or incorporate them, as shall be judged 
proper."5 In reaffirming their opposition on the next to 
last meeting of the Constitutional Convention, Mason and 
Randolph, without any reference to a bill of rights, 
announced that they were voting against the Constitution so 
that they would be free to vote against it in their state's 
ratifying convention. In other words, having failed to 
shape the Constitution to their satisfaction at the 
Convention, they would attempt to amend, or if necessary,
3 Madison, Notes, 630-631.
4 Ibid.. 566.
5 Ibid.. 567.
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defeat it at the state level —  a forum where they had more 
experience and wielded considerably more influence.
Interestingly, in devising the ratification process, 
delegates at the Philadelphia Convention anticipated much of 
the strategy that opponents to the Constitution, the so- 
called "Antifederalists," would later employ. Gouverneur 
Morris and Charles Pinckney tried, unsuccessfully, to insert 
in the ratification provisions that state conventions be 
called "as speedily as circumstances will permit." 
Specifically, "Morris said his object was to impress in 
stronger terms the necessity of calling Conventions in order 
to prevent enemies to the plan, from giving it the go by.
By degrees the State officers, & those interested in the 
State [Governments] will intrigue & turn the popular current 
against it."6
Luther Martin, who had attended most of the 
Philadelphia Convention as a member of the Maryland 
delegation (but departed before the Constitution was 
adopted), agreed that "after a while the people would be 
[against] it, but for a different reason than that alleged." 
He believed that the people would not ratify the 
Constitution unless "hurried into it by surprise."7 
Elbridge Gerry, the third delegate who refused to sign, 
concurred with Martin and asked the delegates to reconsider
6 Ibid.. 566.
7 Ibid.
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their decision to require ratification by just nine states. 
As Madison described, Gerry "represented the [proposed] 
system as full of vices, and dwelt on the impropriety of 
distroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous 
consent of the parties to it."8 In a final attempt to 
prolong the ratification process, Gerry tried unsuccessfully 
to restore a previously deleted provision that would have 
required the consent of the Confederation Congress as 
well.9
In all fairness, much of what these, and other 
Antifederalists objected to in the proposed Constitution 
stemmed from honest philosophical disagreements over the 
nature of government, the separation of powers (including 
federalism itself), and more generally, the understanding of 
human psychology and political behavior advanced by the 
Federalists. Specifically, the Antifederalists worried that 
the Constitution would not preserve a limited form of 
national government. Rather, they believed that despite the 
purported safeguards of specific, enumerated powers, the 
Constitution would create a consolidated national 
government. For example, through its powers to tax, make 
treaties, raise an army and navy, and, most especially,
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.. 611.
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carrying into Execution,"10 the Antifederalists believed 
that the new national government would result in a total 
domination of the state governments and the people 
themselves.11 In short, the Antifederalists rejected 
Madison's entire concept of the extended republic, arguing 
as the essayist "Agrippa" did that "no extensive empire can 
be governed upon republican principles, and that such a 
government will degenerate to a despotism, unless it be made 
up of a confederacy of smaller states, each having the full 
powers of internal regulation."12
In their public remarks, however, the Antifederalists 
frequently painted their objections to the Constitution in 
bleak hyperbole. The essayist "Centinel" accused the 
framers of attempting to establish a permanent aristocracy, 
a form of government "which ever abominates and suppresses 
all free inquiry and discussion ..." as evidenced by their 
having "made no provision for the liberty of the press, that 
grand palladium of freedom, and scourge of tyrants ...."13 
Luther Martin plumbed the depths of demagoguery by declaring 
that:
I most sacredly believe [that the founders] object
is the total abolition and destruction of all
state governments, and the erection on their ruins
10 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
II Kenyon, ed., The Anti-Federalists, xli-xlviii.
12 Kenyon, ed., The Anti-Federalists. 132-133.
13 Ibid. . 13 .
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of one great and extensive empire, calculated to 
aggrandize and elevate its rulers and chief 
officers far above the common herd of mankind, to 
enrich them with wealth, and to encircle them with 
honours and glory, and which according to my 
judgement on the maturest reflection, must 
inevitably be attended with the most humiliating 
and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by 
the sweat of whose brows, and by the toil of whose 
bodies, it can only be affected.14
These remarks are important, not so much for the dire 
warning they sound about the founders' intentions, but for 
what they suggest about the nature of the public debate that 
ensued over the ratification of the Constitution. Historian 
Leonard Levy suggests that most opponents of the 
Constitution genuinely feared, in varying degrees, the 
proposed national government.15 Some Antifederalists, 
however, deliberately exacerbated this climate of fear by 
resorting to demagoguery in order to defeat the 
Constitution. As Levy argues, ,f[m]erely to denounce the 
omission of freedom of the press and other liberties was 
superbly effective and even useful as a mask for less 
elevating, perhaps sordid, objections to the Constitution 
concerning such matters as tax and commerce powers.1*16 As 
the Constitution underwent ratification, charges that it 
would eclipse the power of the states gave Antifederalists 
in the state ratifying conventions a compelling reason to
14 Ibid. . 169-170.
15 Levy, 234-235.
16 Ibid.
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reject it. Charges that the Constitution would result in a 
general repression of rights and create a permanent 
aristocracy pervaded the popular rhetoric.
B. The State Ratifying Conventions
1. Pennsylvania 
News of the Constitution began filtering out of 
Philadelphia in the weeks following the Convention, and, 
after an official endorsement from the Confederation 
Congress, the struggle for state ratification began. The 
Pennsylvania legislature, having been presented with the 
Constitution the day after the Philadelphia Convention 
concluded, immediately set about the task of calling for a 
ratifying convention. Nonetheless, by the time the 
ratification convention convened in late November, 
newspapers, pamphleteers, and speakers of every kind had 
fueled a rancorous public debate.
Of this popular debate, Wat Tyler reminded his fellow 
Pennsylvanians a month before their ratifying convention 
began that:
few men comprehend the science of government, and, 
that destitute of judgment, the people are only 
influenced by their passions. Hence arises the 
expediency of resorting to sound instead of sense; 
and of bewildering the imagination with visionary 
terrors, instead of instructing the understanding 
with rational disquisition, or candid
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interpretation.17 
On a more substantive note, the author M.C. observed in the 
Pennsylvania Herald days later that while many men, 
including many learned men, had been excited by the various 
doomsaying Antifederalist tracts, their concerns were not 
unreasonable, but rather stemmed from genuine patriotism, 
"fearful for the liberty of posterity and anxious to prevent 
future encroachments of Congress.1,18 M.C. went on to argue 
that to prevent such encroachments, and in order to preserve 
the liberty of the press as well as other rights, a meeting 
of citizens should be called to draft a bill of rights to be 
transmitted to the states for simultaneous consideration 
with the Constitution.19
M.C.'s argument is especially significant in that it 
foreshadowed the strategy that many of the Antifederalists 
would take in the coming months, namely: that the
Constitution itself was so defective as to warrant the 
calling of a second convention to draft a new one. While 
not completely successful in Pennsylvania, this tactic did 
succeed in encouraging twenty-one of the twenty-three 
conventioneers who voted against the Constitution to
17 Merrill Jensen, et al., eds., The Documentary History 
of the Ratification of the Constitution of the United States 
(Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976- ), 
2:202.
18 Ibid. . 2:204
19 Ibid.
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formally dissent: to ratification. As drafted by Robert 
Whitehill, the minority dissent essentially echoed the most 
significant Antifederalist charges: omission of a bill of
rights and the inordinate grant of power to the national 
government which threatened state sovereignty making the 
unamended constitution unacceptable.20
On the side of the majority, James Wilson articulated 
the counter-strategy that the Federalists would successfully 
employ throughout the ratification struggle. Wilson argued 
that the new federal government would be limited to the 
exercise of specific, enumerated powers, and that since this 
government was entitled to no specific authority to abridge 
the rights of individual citizens, a bill of rights would be 
unnecessary. Furthermore, Wilson argued, those who were 
citizens of states that already had bills of rights, such as 
Pennsylvania, would still have their rights protected. 
Citizens of states that did not have bills of rights, 
moreover, were ample proof, based on the general liberty 
afforded citizens throughout the Confederation, that such 
declarations were essentially unneeded.21
20 Ibid. , 3:617-631
21 Robert Green McCloskey, ed., The Works of James 
Wilson (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1967), 2:145.
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2. Massachusetts
The twin themes of the need for a bill of rights and 
amendments to preserve state power played themselves out 
again in next state ratifying convention where the 
Constitution was seriously challenged —  Massachusetts. 
Though through a series of political maneuvers22 the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention was packed with 
supporters of the Federalist cause, Elbridge Gerry, by 
publishing a list of his objections to the Constitution, 
rallied the Antifederalist opposition. Ultimately, however, 
pleas for compromise by John Adams and John Hancock proved 
to be more persuasive. The essence of this compromise was 
that although the convention would formally ratify, it would 
do so only with the clear understanding that Massachusetts, 
as well as the other states, would retain sovereignty in all 
respects not specifically reserved by the national 
government. Moreover, the Adams-Hancock compromise resulted 
in a suggested list of amendments to be considered at some 
future date.23 Interestingly, these suggested amendments, 
which included protections for the liberty of the press and 
the freedom of conscience, were silent on the question of 
free speech.
22 Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 
(New York: Norton, 1972), 486.
23 See Michael Allen Gillespie, "Massachusetts: Creating 
Consensus,” in Michael Allen Gillespie, et al., Ratifying 
the Constitution (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas 
Press, 1989) 144-158.
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3. Virginia
With the ratification by Massachusetts on February 6, 
1788, the call for amendments began in earnest. In a letter 
to George Washington nine days later, Madison described the 
prospect of introducing amendments as a blemish on 
ratification, but a blemish "in the least offensive form."24 
In other words, nearly six months before the Virginia 
ratifying convention convened, Madison, though essentially 
unconvinced as to the necessity of amendments, feared the 
prospect as little more than a nuisance. As we will see, 
this is exactly the strategy that Madison would employ in 
his state's convention as well as in the First Federal 
Congress; in order to defeat the Antifederalists, he gave 
them exactly what they demanded —  amendments —  without 
giving them what they really wanted —  a second 
constitutional convention.
As the Virginia convention approached, even Edmund 
Randolph, one of three delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention who refused to sign, began having doubts about 
the Antifederalist cause. In a letter to James Madison 
dated April 17, 1788, Randolph voiced "grave suspicions" of 
the motives of those calling for amendments. He believed 
that a political game was being played by the 
"Amendmentites," whom he feared "more and more daily; not 
knowing how far the scheme of those, who externally
24 Jensen, et al., eds., Documentary History. 4:505.
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patronize them, may internally extend."25
When the Virginia convention convened on June 2, 1788, 
eight of the nine required states had already ratified. 
Accordingly, Virginia's endorsement, or lack thereof, 
particularly given its population and political importance, 
would either carry the Constitution to victory or ensure its 
ultimate defeat. Support for the Federalist and 
Antifederalist positions, moreover, was more or less evenly 
split both in the convention itself and in popular opinion. 
On the second day of the convention, Patrick Henry, who, as 
legend has it, declined an invitation to be a delegate to 
the Philadelphia convention because he "smelt a rat," lent 
his considerable elocutionary skill to the Antifederalist 
cause. Henry declared that he had come to express the 
uneasiness of his constituents on having been "brought from 
that state of full security [the Articles of Confederation], 
which they enjoyed, to the delusive appearance of things 
[the Constitution]." Henry rhetorically asked who had 
authorized the Philadelphia Convention to speak for "We, the 
People" instead of "We the States," in that "[s]tates are 
the characteristics, and the soul of a confederation."26
Essentially, as others had argued before, Henry was 
rejecting Madison's conception of the extended republic.
25 Robert Allen Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of 
Rights. 1776-1791 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina, 1955), 167.
26 Jensen, et al., eds., Documentary Record. 4:930.
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Moreover, Henry's chief concern was the preservation of 
state power. George Mason echoed this line of attack by 
arguing more specifically that history, "supported by the 
opinions of the best writers [i.e., Montesquieu], shew us, 
that monarchy may suit a large territory, and despotic 
Governments ever so extensive a country; but that popular 
Governments can only exist in small territories [such as the 
present states]."27 As a secondary consideration for 
rejecting the Constitution, both Henry and Mason argued that 
endorsing a national government of the kind proposed would 
jeopardize rights.28
In response, Madison argued that:
on a candid examination of history, we shall find 
that turbulence, violence, and abuse of power, by 
the majority trampling on the rights of the 
minority, have produced factions and commotions, 
which, in republics, have more frequently than any 
other cause, produced despotism.29
In other words, the size of the republic for Madison was
immaterial. Whereas the causes of faction might have less
effect in a small republic, faction was, for Madison, a fact
of political life in popular government no matter the size
of the republic in question. Consequently, the essential
dilemma facing popular government for Madison is not how to
maintain a modest-sized republic in order to minimize
27 Ibid. . 4:937.
28 Ibid. . 4:937-951
29 Ibid. . 4:990.
faction, but, rather, how to create a political culture in
which the effects of faction can be minimized. In this
regard, Madison believed that such a political culture was 
possible only if a diversity of interests and factions could 
be made to counter-balance one another. Once again, the 
conceptual devices Madison employed toward this end were the 
extended republic, separation of powers, federalism, the 
leadership of a natural aristocracy, and the virtue of the 
people.
It was the reasoning of arguments such as these that
led Edmund Randolph to change his mind once again, this time
in support of the Constitution. On June 25, 1788, Randolph
recounted for his fellow Virginians that:
I went to the federal Convention ... I refused to 
subscribe, because I had, as I still have, 
objections to the Constitution, and wished a free 
inquiry into its merits. [But] the accession of 
eight states reduced our deliberations to the 
single question of Union or no Union ... When I 
see safety on my right, and destruction on my 
left, ... I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of 
the former.30
And this, in an elemental sense, is the issue that remained 
when all debate had concluded in Virginia and elsewhere. 
Despite the misgivings of many Antifederalists, anti­
nationalists, and those with various regional and economic 
interests that felt threatened by the Constitution, and 
despite the frequent sincerity and unfortunate demagoguery 
with which these objections were articulated in the public
30 Ibid.
45
imagination, the issue before the ratifying conventions was
simply, as Randolph argued, union or no union.
Once the issue of a second convention was put to rest,
all that the Antifederalists could hope for were amendments
to alter the gravest defects of the Constitution, which in
Virginia, was precisely the compromise reached. Yet in
reaching this compromise, one last effort was made by the
Antifederalists to defeat ratification. Since ratification
seemed inevitable in the closing days of the Virginia
convention, a final attempt was made to condition
ratification on the acceptance, by all of the states, of
certain corrective amendments. To Madison, the strategy was
clear. On June 25, 1788, he summarized the juncture at
which the convention had arrived:
If we propose the conditional amendments, I 
entreat gentlemen to consider the distance to 
which they throw the ultimate settlement, and the 
extreme risk of perpetual disunion. They cannot 
but see how easy it will be to obtain subsequent 
amendments. They can be proposed when the 
legislatures of two thirds of the states shall 
make application for that purpose; and the 
legislature of three fourths of the states, or 
conventions in the same, can fix the amendments so 
proposed. If there be an equal zeal in every 
state, can there be a doubt that they will concur 
in reasonable amendments? If, on the other hand, 
we call on the states to rescind what they have 
done, and confess that they have done wrong, and 
to consider the subject again, it will produce 
such unnecessary delays, and is pregnant with such 
infinite dangers, that I cannot contemplate it 
without horror. There are uncertainty and 
confusion on the one hand, and order, tranquility, 
and certainty, on the other. Let us not hesitate
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to elect the latter alternative.31 
Two days later, the Virginia assembly endorsed ratification, 
simultaneously endorsing a proposed list of amendments 
(including a provision protecting speech and press freedom 
based on Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights authored by 
George Mason) to be considered by Congress at their first 
assembly under the new Constitution.32 In short, when 
confronted with a choice between a weak confederation and an 
energetic national government, the Virginia convention chose 
the latter, unamended, despite the plethora of arguments 
that individual freedoms would be threatened in the process. 
That the ratification convention ultimately put its trust in 
the new national government to initiate corrective 
amendments, in the precise manner that the Constitution 
prescribed and that Madison advocated, indicates the extent 
to which Madison's constitutional theory proved 
irresistible.
! 4. New York
Eight days prior to Virginia's ratification, the final 
critical state convention convened in New York. Though 
ratification, according to the terms specified in the
31 Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several 
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution as Recommended bv the General Convention at 
Philadelphia in 1787. 2d ed., (New York: Burt Franklin,
1888), 629-630.
32 Ibid. . 657.
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Constitution, was already accomplished, without the 
accession of New York, perhaps the most commercially 
important state of the time, the character of the new union 
would be tainted. It was out of concern for a successful 
convention, as well as to assuage fears nationwide, that 
Madison, along with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, 
published an anonymous series of essays, advocating the 
merits of the proposed frame of national government. These 
essays became The Federalist, unquestionably the fullest 
articulation of the theory underlying the U.S. Constitution.
The debate in the New York convention centered around 
the same fundamental issues agonized over in the other state 
conventions. Underneath all of the objections and rebuttals 
presented in the convention, though cast in the particular 
concerns and interests of the empire state, the essential 
question re-emerged: would the new national government be
able to control itself, or would it usurp the sovereignty of 
the state governments and obliterate the rights of the 
people in the process? As Cecil Eubanks noted, the 
delegates to the New York convention generally agreed that a 
strengthened national government was needed to provide some 
consistency in matters of trade and commerce, but they 
feared national power. Though many favored ratification,
f
many also favored corrective amendments and perhaps a second
convention.33
Melanchton Smith, a prominent New York political figure 
and opponent of the Constitution, temporarily gained the 
upper hand in the convention when he championed an effort to 
proceed with ratification on the condition of subsequent 
amendments. Ultimately, Smith retreated from this position 
when presented by a letter from Madison to Smith's friend, 
Alexander Hamilton, in which Madison argued that "subsequent 
conditions" were unacceptable and that anything less than an 
unconditional ratification would be a tainted 
ratification.34 The following day, the letter was read by 
Hamilton before the Convention. Afterward, the proposal 
calling for conditional amendments was altered to simply 
recommend various amendments35, including a provision for 
free speech and press protection for subsequent 
consideration by the states and the First Congress. Two 
days later, the Convention ratified the Constitution, and 
the new national government became an unquestioned reality.
33 Cecil L., Eubanks, "Federalism and the Political 
Economy of the Union," in Ratifying the Constitution. 328- 
329.
34 Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds., The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961-1979), 5:184-185.
35 Ibid.
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C. James Madison's Conversion to the Amendment Cause 
Partisan tempers did not cool immediately with the 
conclusion of the ratification process. In Virginia, 
Madison's political enemies, most notably Patrick Henry, not 
only conveniently overlooked him for one of Virginia's two 
Senate seats, but gerrymandered his home congressional 
district to include as many pockets of Antifederalist 
sentiment as they could. Madison's opponent, James Monroe, 
used this to his advantage by campaigning on the need for 
amendments and by charging that Madison was "dogmatically 
attached to the Constitution in every clause, syllable and 
letter.”36 In the face of this political battle, Madison's 
opposition to constitutional amendments began to soften.
This transformation in thought is significant, for, as 
we have seen, Madison viewed factions, and not just and 
well-ordered governments, as the chief threat to individual 
liberties in a popular government. In a letter to his 
friend Thomas Jefferson, Madison argued that though he was 
generally unopposed to a bill of rights, so long as the 
enumerated powers of Congress were left intact, he did not 
believe that such "parchment barriers" were necessary, nor 
did he believe that they would accomplish their intended 
function. Specifically, he argued that:
[w]herever the real power in a Government lies,
36 William T. Hutchinson, et al., eds., The Papers of 
James Madison (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1977- ), 11:418.
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there is the danger of oppression. In our 
Governments the real power lies in the majority of 
the community, and the invasion of private rights 
is chiefly,to be apprehended, not from acts of 
Government contrary to the sense of its 
constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major
number of the constituents.37
In other words, given Madison's belief that factions are the
greatest threat to liberty and popular government, a bill of
rights would be unnecessary in that the various structural
devices of the extended republic, including federalism and
the separation of powers, were seen by him to be more than
adequate in controlling the effects of factions.
Clearly, though elegant from a theoretical standpoint,
the two weakest links in Madison's reasoning are: 1) his
assumption that the extended republic would produce a
talented, principled leadership essentially immune to the
whims of popular opinion, and 2) that the people possess
enough virtue to select virtuous leaders, and to trust the
system. The various devices of the extended republic, after
all, are only capable of countering the ill effects of
faction —  they cannot fully displace parochial concerns
with "public spiritedness."
Jefferson, in reply, suggested to Madison that a bill
of rights would be worthwhile if for no other reason that it
would put appropriate authority in the hands of the Supreme
Court to check the powers of Congress. This authority would
37 Ibid. . 11:297-30
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also give the state governments, Jefferson argued, a similar 
check.38 In other words, Jefferson presented Madison with a 
rationale for a bill of rights that fit securely within 
Madison's theory of balancing power against power and 
faction against faction; rather than weakening the devices 
of the extended republic, a bill of rights could actually 
serve to accentuate their efficiency. Nonetheless, even 
with this additional check, the system would demand an 
essential residuum of "public spiritedness" in order to 
function properly.
Even before receiving Jefferson's letter, Madison was 
coming to accept the idea of a bill of rights. Though he 
had yet to embrace the idea of amendments, Madison argued 
that if "pursued with a proper moderation and in a proper 
mode, [amendments] will be not only be safe, but may serve 
the double purpose of satisfying the minds of well meaning 
opponents, and of providing additional guards in favour of 
liberty."39 Whether by Jefferson's or his own reasoning, 
Madison slowly began to warm to the idea of constitutional 
amendments. If nothing else, it is certain that Madison 
considered himself morally bound to work for amendments, not 
only because of promises he made during his campaign, but 
because of the explicit instructions of Virginia's ratifying
38 Julian P. Boyd, et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950- ), 13:659-661.
39 Papers of James Madison. 11:404-405.
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convention.
D. The First Federal Congress and the Creation of
the First Amendment
The First Federal Congress convened in New York City on 
March 4, 1789. A quorum was reached on April 6th, and the 
following month, as promised, Madison introduced the subject 
of Amendments, but postponed making a formal proposal until 
June 8th. By the time Madison made his formal proposal, the 
legislatures of Virginia (on May 5th) and New York (on May 
6th) had already petitioned the new congress for a second 
convention in order to address the serious defects of the 
Constitution. In order to mollify state concerns, Madison's 
eventual proposal essentially synthesized the various state 
recommendations (Massachusetts, South Carolina, New 
Hampshire, Virginia and New York) for corrective amendments, 
including a provision protecting the freedoms of press and 
speech. In addition, Madison proposed two protections no 
state had asked for, namely, that no person could be forced 
to give up his property without just compensation and that 
no state [emphasis added] could infringe the equal rights of 
conscience, freedom of the press, or trial by jury in 
criminal cases.40
Despite Madison's efforts, Federalist and 
Antifederalist sympathizers in Congress alike proved less
40 Veit, et al., eds., Creating the Bill of Rights. 11-
31.
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than enthusiastic. Many Federalists still believed that a
bill of rights was unnecessary, whereas many Antifederalists
feared that if only rights-oriented amendments were adopted,
any chance of major structural amendments, or even of
another constitutional convention, would be lessened.41
Nonetheless, Madison pressed on. Upon making his formal
proposal to the House, Madison argued that:
[h]is object was to quiet the mind of the people 
by giving them some early assurance of a 
disposition in the house to provide expressly 
against all encroachments on their liberties, and 
against the abuses to which the principles of the 
constitution were liable.42
In response to arguments made by his fellow members that
there was more pressing business before the House, such as a
tax bill and a bill to create a lesser federal judiciary,
Madison responded:
I am sorry to be accessory to the loss of a single 
moment of time by the house.... If I thought I 
could fulfill the duty which I owe to myself and 
my constituents, to let the subject pass over in 
silence, I most certainly should not trespass upon 
the indulgence of this house. But I cannot do 
this; and am therefore compelled to beg a patient 
hearing to what I have to lay before you. And I 
do most sincerely believe that if congress will 
devote but one day to this subject, so far as to 
satisfy the public that we do not disregard their 
wishes, it will have a salutary influence on the 
public councils, and prepare the way for a 
favorable reception of our future measures.43
Nonetheless, despite Madison's pleas, Congress was
41 Ibid. , xiv-xv.
42 Ibid. . 63.
43 Ibid. . 77.
54
reluctant to undertake amending the Constitution, and voted 
instead to put the whole matter before a committee of the 
whole at some future date. On July 21, 1789, Madison once 
again asked his colleagues to consider the business of 
amendments. Again, the members of the House debated not the 
worthiness of the amendments, but rather, questioned the 
propriety of wasting valuable time when other, more 
important matters were still pressing. Massachusetts 
Congressman Fisher Ames, an avowed Federalist, argued that a 
special, select committee, rather than a committee of the 
whole, would be better able to deal with the question of 
amendments. Elbridge Gerry once again articulated the 
Antifederalist objection, arguing that the matter was too 
important to be left to a select committee, but as yet, 
Congress was still too busy to deal with the issue in a 
committee of the whole. In other words, Gerry wanted the 
whole matter postponed indefinitely. Nonetheless, the 
majority Federalist position prevailed, and the House voted 
to refer the issue to a select committee comprised of 
members from every state.44
On August 13, 1789, Virginia Representative Richard 
Bland Lee moved that the House should form itself into a 
committee of the whole in order to consider the report of 
the select committee on the subject of constitutional 
amendments. Once again, the opposition argued
i
44 Ibid. . 97-103.
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unsuccessfully against the motion, offering that the matter 
was too delicate to be considered at a time when the House 
had to contend with more pressing matters.45 After a 
lengthy debate Concerning whether the amendments should be 
incorporated in the text of the Constitution, as Madison 
wanted, it was decided that they would appear as an appendix 
to the Constitution, and with that, the individual 
amendments were finally set for full consideration by the 
House.46 Two days later, what would eventually become the 
First Amendment, which many in our present day consider the 
epitome of the spirit of liberty envisioned by the founding 
fathers, was reluctantly taken up for discussion by the 
First Federal Congress.
South Carolina Representative and Antifederalist Thomas 
Tudor Tucker, upon the first reading of what was then the 
fifth proposed amendment, moved to insert language 
qualifying the speech and press freedom of individuals as a 
means of instructing their representatives. This proposal 
ultimately resulted in more debate than any other question 
as to the basic efficacy of protecting speech and press 
freedom. Pennsylvania Representative Thomas Hartley opposed 
Tuckers's proposed insertion on straight-forward Madisonian 
grounds. He argued that:
[t]he power of instructing might be liable to
45 Ibid. . 104.
46 Ibid. . 112-128
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great abuses; it would generally be exercised in 
times of public disturbance, and would express 
rather the prejudices of faction, than the voice 
of policy; thus, it would convey improper 
influences into the government.47
In support of Hartley, Connecticut Representative Roger
Sherman echoed Burke's understanding of representative
legislators by arguing that:
instructions were not a proper rule for the 
representative, since they were not adequate to 
the purposes for which he was delegated. He was 
to consult the common good of the whole, and was 
the servant of the people at large. If they 
should coincide with his ideas of the common good, 
they would be unnecessary; if they contradicted 
them, he would be bound by every principle of 
justice to disregard them.48
Only Elbridge Gerry openly supported the proposal by arguing
that if the people were sovereign, as contended, then it
would be inconceivable that they not also have."the right to
instruct their agents at their pleasure.1,49
Once again, it would be for Madison to clarify the
question at hand. In general, Madison opposed Tucker's
motion because it spoke of a "doubtful" right, one which
many people, himself and those in state government included,
would find especially worrisome, particularly in light of
his dual objective of mollifying critics and preserving the
basic structure of government intended by the Constitution.
Madison agreed that the proposal was partially true, that
47 Ibid. . 151.
48 Ibid. . 151.
49 Ibid. . 152.
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the people most definitely have a right to speak and publish
their sentiments on political issues, and also
unquestionably have a right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances. Nonetheless, the proposition that
such views should obligate Congress in anyway, Madison
argued, was "certainly false." With specific regard to
Gerry's remark, Madison agreed that the people are
sovereign, but asked:
who are the people? Is every small district, the 
PEOPLE? and do the inhabits of this district express 
the voice of the people, when they may not be a 
thousandth part, and although their instructions may 
contradict the sense of the whole people besides? Have 
the people in detached assemblies a right to violate 
the constitution or controul the actions of the whole 
sovereign power? This would be setting up a hundred 
sovereignties to the place of one.50
South Carolina Representative William Smith offered that if
Congress were bound by the instructions of constituents,
then states in closer proximity to Congress would have an
i
unfair advantage in that they would have greater ease
conveying their sentiments (owing to the communications
technologies of the day) to their congressmen.51 And
perhaps most acutely, Maryland Representative Michael Stone
argued that adopting the Tucker motion would change the
nature of the Constitution:
[i]nstead of being a representative government, it 
would be a singular kind of democracy, and 
whenever a question arose [as to] what was the
50 Ibid. . 152.
51 Ibid. . 153.
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law, it would not properly be decided by recurring 
to the codes and institutions of Congress, but by 
collecting the various instructions of different 
parts of the Union.52
Quite simply, creating a system of government in which 
public opinion played a fundamental role in the formulation 
of public policy was not what the founders intended. With a 
few subsequent, minor revisions, the First Congress adopted 
what would become the First Amendment without ever debating 
the merits of protecting speech and press again.
Ultimately, the question of free speech and press, as well 
as the other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, were 
forced upon the First Congress as part of the political 
battle surrounding ratification of the Constitution, not as 
a result of some deeply held constitutional theory.
On August 19, 1789, James Madison, in a letter to 
Richard Peters, outlined his reasoning for supporting what 
he described as the "nauseous project of amendments."
First, Madison argued that a declaration of rights is not, 
in and of itself, an improper thing to be contained in the 
Constitution in that every government has the propensity to 
oppress its subjects, and a paper barrier, though frequently 
transgressed, is never powerless. Secondly, Madison argued, 
many of the states ratified the Constitution with the tacit 
assumption that certain amendments would be undertaken. 
Thirdly, had amendments not been promised, Madison argued
52 Ibid.
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that the Virginia congressional delegation would have been 
composed "almost wholly of disaffected characters...." 
Fourthly, had the Federalists not raised the subject of 
amendments, the Antifederalists almost certainly would have 
if only to make the point that they were forcing their 
opponents to keep their word. Fifthly, and perhaps most 
importantly, Madison argued that proposing amendments would 
"kill the opposition every where..." giving greater 
credibility to the new government in the process. And 
finally, if no amendments had been proposed, Antifederalist 
arguments that the aim of the new government was to deprive 
the people of their liberties would be reinvigorated, and 
the likelihood of a second convention would be trebled with 
Congress having failed to deliver on the corrective measures 
it had been instructed to render.53
53 Ibid. . 281-282.
CHAPTER III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT WITHIN 
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF JAMES MADISON
Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter Two, James Madison
came around to the idea of amendments because he believed
they could be secured without seriously altering the balance
of powers achieved by the Constitution. In sum, the
rationale for protecting free speech and a free press can be
fit securely within Madison's conception of the extended
republic. As Madison noted in Federalist No. 51:
[i]n the extended republic of the United States, 
and among the great variety of interests, parties 
and sects which it embraces [and I take him to 
mean the expression of these interests, parties 
and sects by means of speech and press], a 
coalition of a majority of the whole society could 
seldom take place on any other principles than 
those of justice and the general good; and there 
being thus less danger to a minor from the will of 
the major party, there must be less pretext also, 
to provide for the security of the former, by 
introducing into the government a will not 
dependent on the latter; or in other words, a 
will independent of the society itself.1
The capacity of the extended republic to accommodate
variety, neutralize faction and nourish an environment in
which self-government and good government can flourish
1 Cooke, ed., "Federalist No. 51," 352-353.
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simultaneously provides an excellent rationale for 
protecting the freedoms of speech and press. As we have 
seen, at the heart of Madison's extended republic is the 
proposition that the ill effects of faction (the greatest 
threat to self-government) must be controlled. So long as 
the underlying interests that give rise to factions are 
diverse, and so long as the powers of government are 
sufficiently separated and balanced to prevent majorities 
from asserting themselves in the political arena except in a 
manner conforming to the best interests of the whole nation, 
then the deleterious effect of factions will be neutralized.
In this sense, ideas, whether expressed in writing or 
speech, can be seen to fit within Madison's theory of human 
psychology which explains the inevitability of factions. As 
noted earlier, this theory argues that the cause of factions 
are individuals and groups, who, having exercised their 
highly fallible powers of reasoning, form a myriad of 
opinions on every aspect of the human condition, to which 
their passions are attached. This combination of passion
t
and opinion, moreover, results in the human proclivity to 
self-assertion, giving rise to both factions and their ill 
effects. If we consider the interchange of ideas in the 
popular arena, as Madison essentially did, as simply a 
manifestation of human nature and its faction-forming 
propensity, then the challenge that self-expression 
represents to self-government is the same challenge that
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faction poses to self-government generally.
Since extinguishing liberty is worse than suffering its 
excesses, the way to best protect the freedoms of speech and 
press within the context of Madison's theory is to provide a 
framework, much like the extended republic, in which a wide 
diversity of ideas are made to compete and balance each
f
other. The separation of government powers, as well as the 
degree to which representative legislators are separated 
from factious minority opinion, provides a further barrier 
minimizing the assertion of factious majorities (and their 
ideas) in the process of self-government —  except in those 
instances where a majority consensus is satisfied that such 
an assertion is warranted by the need to serve the common 
good. In other words, by proclaiming that the freedoms of 
speech and press are beyond the power of Congress, and given 
that it is assumed that such protection will result in a 
diversity of opinions and ideas being introduced into the 
public imagination, the First Amendment, by embracing a 
sphere of activity typified by the assertion of factions, 
seeks to control the ill effects of those factions by 
ensuring their rich diversity, and ultimately, their mutual 
counter-action and neutralization.
In sum, Madison's constitutional philosophy, including 
the First Amendment, results in a representative national 
government constrained by a majority public opinion which in 
turn is constrained by public spiritedness as well as the
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filtration mechanisms of the extended republic. As Madison
noted in 1791:
[pjublic opinion sets bounds to every government, and 
is the real sovereign in every free one. As there are 
cases where the Public Opinion must be obeyed by the 
government; so there are cases, where not being fixed, 
it may be influenced by the government. This 
distinction, if kept in view, would prevent or decide 
many debates on the respect due from the government to 
the sentiments of the people.... Whatever facilitates 
a general intercourse of sentiments, [such] as good 
roads, domestic commerce, a free press, and 
particularly a circulation of newspapers through the 
entire body of the people, and Representatives going 
from, and returning among every part of them, is 
equivalent to a contraction of territorial limits, and 
is favorable to liberty, where these may be too 
extensive, (emphasis omitted). 2
All of which adds another dimension, beyond the simply 
political, explaining Madison's ultimate support for a 
constitutional amendment protecting speech and press 
freedom. While it is clear how Madison was able to fit the 
media protections of the First Amendment within his general 
constitutional theory, it is less clear what the other 
members of the First Congress, or the state conventions that 
ultimately ratified the Bill of Rights had in mind. Rather, 
instead of providing a clear historical record, the
documentary histories of the First Congress and those of the
state conventions, reveal only apathy, ambiguity, brevity 
and political intrigue. As historian Leonard Levy notes, 
while there is no doubt that Congress and the state
conventions cared about protecting speech and press, "no one
2 Gaillard Hunt, ed., "Public Opinion," The Writings of 
James Madison. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906), VI:70.
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seems to have cared enough to clarify what [they] meant by 
the subject upon which [they] lavished praise.”3 Levy, 
moreover, offers what I think is one of the best examples 
demonstrating that the founding fathers had little idea of 
exactly what they were protecting. Levy argues in The 
Emergence of a Free Press that despite the colonial American 
precedent of the Peter Zenger trial and another half dozen 
similar cases, the concept of seditious libel remained 
unchallenged before and after the First Amendment. Levy 
argues that the Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted by Congress 
in 1798, were used with particular vehemence against 
newspaper publishers critical of the Adams administration. 
Surprisingly, despite the guarantee of the First Amendment, 
supporters of the Act argued that the First Amendment did 
not repudiate the common law concept of seditious libel—  
namely, that harsh criticism of the government and those in 
it, whether true or not, constitutes a libelous injury to 
the government itself.4
As an example, Levy argues that the controversy over 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, which pitted Jefferson's 
Republican party against the Federalists, ultimately 
resulted in the libertarian understanding of free press and
3 Levy, 2
4 Ibid.. 274-281.
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speech that we have today.5 For example, in opposing the 
Acts, Madison articulated the significance of speech and 
press freedom in a significantly different manner, and with 
a stronger conviction than he had in the First Federal 
Congress.6
The most compelling explanation for Madison's change
of heart, however, is found in the changing political
culture of the nation itself. In his landmark work, The
Radicalism of the American Revolution, historian Gordon S.
Wood argues that the American Revolution set loose cultural
forces that eventually produced an uniquely American
paradigm of democratic government. Specifically, Wood
argues that in the decades following the Revolutions
[t]he founding fathers were unsettled and fearful not 
because the American Revolution had failed but because 
it had succeeded, and succeeded only too well. What 
happened in America in the decades following the 
Declaration of Independence was after all only an 
extension of all that the revolutionary leaders had 
advocated. White males had taken only too seriously 
the belief that they were free and equal with the right
5 The author wishes to stress that although the Levy 
thesis has been-sharply criticized for its focus on 
seditious libel as the principal touchstone by which to 
measure the founders' commitment to free speech and a free 
press, such criticism has left intact this author's 
contention that the contemporary libertarian understanding 
of the First Amendment was not soley the product of the 
Constitutional Convention, the First Federal Congress, nor 
the struggle to ratify the Constitution or the Bill of 
Rights. See generally, David M. Rabban, "Historical 
Perspectives on the Free Press: [Book] Review Essay: The 
Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression 
in Early American History.” 37 Stanford Law Review 795
(1985).
6 Ibid.
66
to pursue their happiness. Indeed, the principles of 
their achievement made possible the eventual strivings 
of others-black slaves and women-for their own freedom, 
independence, and prosperity.7
In this respect, the Constitution, and the political theory
from which it emanates, were ultimately swept up and
transformed by the cultural revolution set loose by the
American Revolution. In combination, these revolutions set
in motion the twin contending themes of equality and liberty
which continue to play themselves out in the political life
of this nation.
A. Madisonianism in the Modern Age 
As it exists today, Madison's model, the Constitution, 
encompasses commitments to both freedom and equality, while 
employing the divergent interests of the extended republic 
to keep these contradictory commitments in equipoise. 
Although frequently used in conjunction, liberty and 
equality, as political ideals, are actually at odds with one 
another; whereas liberty is focused on the state of the 
individual in society, equality is focused on the state of 
society at large. For example, without a commitment to 
equality, a commitment to liberty would result in an 
inequitable hierarchy in society. Similarly, without a 
commitment to liberty, equality would result in the 
degradation of individual rights. Quite simply, without the
i
7 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution (New York: Vintage Books Edition, 1991), 368.
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capacity of the extended republic to neutralize faction, we 
might easily live in a society that placed absolute value on 
individual freedom, without any concern whatsoever for the 
inevitable resulting disparities in wealth and power. On 
the other hand, without the extended republic, we might 
easily live in a society that placed absolute value on 
equality, without any recognition whatsoever of the diverse 
talents and abilities that make each of us unique 
individuals.
In short, without the Madison model, we might have no 
solution for the Madisionian dilemma; that is, how to 
create and maintain a popular, participatory system of 
government without allowing the will of the majority to 
trample on the rights of the minority, while, 
simultaneously, disallowing the minority the ability to 
trample on the right of the majority to govern itself. In 
other words, the Madisonian solution to the Madisonian 
dilemma seeks to avoid both majority and minority tyranny by 
employing the extended republic to neutralize faction and to 
assist the articulation of solutions to contemporary 
problems in a manner that preserves good government. By 
doing so, the Madisonian model assumes that the values of 
political majorities, both in Congress and the public at 
large, when passed through the filter of the extended 
republic, will ultimately articulate and advocate public 
policy choices that serve the greater good. For lack of a
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better term, Madison's model is nothing less than the model 
of American democracy that survives to this day.
B. Conclusion 
On balance, it appears that the contemporary 
incarnation of Madison's model has worked extraordinarily 
well. While we may no longer subscribe to Madison's elitist 
assumptions about a natural aristocracy, voters still tend 
to vote for candidates on the basis of character, not 
issues. As Michael Corbett observes, polling data reveal 
that "[t]he primary function of elections is to determine 
who will make policy decisions, not to determine what the 
policy positions will be.”8 In this respect, the model of 
the extended republic acts as a filter in elections as well; 
as Corbett observes, ”[p]ublic officials who want to be re­
elected are likely to be responsive to very broad segments 
of the population and avoid offending any significant group 
of voters.”9 It is in this manner, moreover, that the model 
is self-correcting; should a representative wholly 
disregard constituent opinion which is highly salient and 
unchanging, he or she is likely to be defeated at the ballot 
box.
In essence, beyond the structural safeguards of the 
Constitution, Madison's model of constitutional democracy
8 Ibid., 323.
9 Ibid., 322.
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requires only two things: 1) diversity in the extended
republic (opinions as well as persons) and 2) a certain 
virtue, or public spiritedness in both elected officials and 
the voting public. The First Amendment serves the 
requirement of diversity, and the mechanism of the extended 
republic filters out the ill effects of faction. What 
remains as the driving force for the articulation and 
enactment of good public policy is public spiritedness 
itself.
It is an optimistic model; it is a model which assumes 
that beneath all of our differences and factional 
allegiances lies a wellspring of commitment simultaneously 
respecting the values of equality and liberty. Such a 
commitment, as Madison observed, is the genius of the whole 
system.
For those who strive for social justice, the model is 
undoubtedly frustrating and slow, for it articulates, but 
does not drive, popular commitment to these values with 
respect to contemporary issues of concern. On balance, 
however, there simply is no denying that the model generally 
moves us in a positive direction; a direction which 
continually demonstrates that it is possible for a people to
govern themselves; a direction which suggests that self-
!
government can be both enduring and good.
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